Any civil action for damages for injury occurring as a result of health care which is provided after June 25, 1976 against:
(1) A person licensed by this state to provide health care or related services, including, but not limited to, a physician, osteopathic physician, dentist, nurse, optometrist, podiatrist, chiropractor, physical therapist, psychologist, pharmacist, optician, physician's assistant, osteopathic physician's assistant, nurse practitioner, or physician's trained mobile intensive care paramedic, including, in the event such person is deceased, his estate or personal representative;
(2) An employee or agent of a person described in subsection (1) of this section, acting in the course and scope of his employment, including, in the event such employee or agent is deceased, his estate or personal representative; or
(3) An entity, whether or not incorporated, facility, or institution employing one or more persons described in subsection (1) of this section, including, but not limited to, a hospital, clinic, health maintenance organization, or nursing home; or an officer, director, employee, or agent thereof acting in the course and scope of his employment, including, in the event such officer, director, employee, or agent is deceased, his estate or personal representative; based upon alleged professional negligence shall be commenced within three years of the act or omission alleged to have caused the injury or condition, or one year of the time the patient or his representative discovered or reasonably should have discovered that the injury or condition was caused by said act or omission, whichever period expires later, except that in no event shall an action be commenced more than eight years after said act or omission: Provided, That the time for commencement of an action is tolled upon proof of fraud, intentional concealment, or the presence of a foreign body not intended to have a therapeutic or diagnostic purpose or effect.
Adams v. Allen, 56 Wash. App. 383, 783 P.2d 635 (1989). (Husband and wife brought a medical malpractice action against a physician for allegedly prescribing an addictive pain medication over an extended time without informing them of the side effects of the medication. The trial court dismissed the malpractice claim as time-barred. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs could recover for prescriptions issued within the three-year statute of limitations. There was also a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the plaintiff consented to the physician's continuing malpractice, thereby precluding summary judgment for the doctor.)
Doyle v. Planned Parenthood of Seattle-King County, 31 Wash. App. 126, 639 P.2d 240 (1982). (In an action for the negligent insertion of an IUD causing a pelvic infection and ultimately necessitating a hysterectomy, the running of the statute is not tolled on the theory that the defendant's failure to warn the patient of the dangers of the IUD constituted a continuing tort lasting until the removal of the device.)
Samuelson v. Freeman, 75 Wash. 2d 894, 454 P.2d 406 (1969). (The statute runs from the time of discovery of the negligent diagnosis. Where malpractice is claimed during a continuous and substantially uninterrupted course of treatment for a particular illness or condition, the statute does not begin to run until the treatment for that particular illness or condition has been terminated.)
Bixler v. Bowman, 94 Wash. 2d 146, 614 P.2d 1290 (1980). (An action for the failure to diagnose a malignancy must be brought within one year of the patient's discovery of the misdiagnosis or within three years after the misdiagnosis, whichever was later. The statute begins to run on the date of the patient's last visit to the physician.)
Winbun v. Moore, 97 Wash. App. 602, 610-613, 982 P.2d 1196 (1999) , reconsideration denied 1999 Wash. App. LEXIS 2027 (Wash. App. Nov. 4, 1999). (The one-year discovery period commences when a patient knows or reasonably should know that his or her injuries were caused by medical malpractice, regardless of whether the patient knows or reasonably should know the alleged tortfeasor's identity.)
Teeter v. Lawson, 25 Wash. App. 560, 610 P.2d 925 (1980). (A patient who brings a malpractice action eleven months after discovery of the cause of the injury is not barred by the statute, which permits a one-year period following discovery but does not require reasonable diligence on the part of the patient to discover the cause of injury.)
Gunnier v. Yakima Heart Center, Inc., 953 P.2d 1162, 1166 (Wash. 1998). (The failure to inform the plaintiff of the results of an echocardiogram was not a fraudulent concealment sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. The plaintiff alleged no facts indicating that the defendant knew or suspected that he had been negligent, or that the defendant misinformed the plaintiff of any medical condition or hampered the plaintiff's discovery of the defendant's possible negligence.)
Wood v. Gibbons, 38 Wash. App. 343, 685 P.2d 619 (1984). (In an action for injury caused by starch powder on the surgical gloves worn by the physician during an operation for a gastrointestinal disorder, the physician will not be estopped from raising the statute of limitations defense on the ground of concealment merely because he did not tell the patient of the contents of the pathology reports, of a medical journal article, or of a change of hospital regulations--all related to starch reactions--where the patient already knew of the possibility that his difficulty might be related to a starch reaction.)