The following actions and proceedings must be commenced within two years:
All claims for recovery pursuant to this act must be commenced within the existing applicable statutes of limitation. In the event that any claim is made against a health care provider subject to the provisions of Article VII more than four years after the breach of contract or tort occurred which is filed within the statute of limitations, such claim shall be defended and paid by the fund if the fund has received a written request for indemnity and defense within 180 days of the date on which notice of the claim is given to the health care provider or his insurer. Where multiple treatments or consultations took place less than four years before the date on which the health care provider or his insurer received notice of the claim, the claim shall be deemed, for purposes of this section, to have occurred less than four years prior to the date of notice and shall be defended by the insurer pursuant to section 702D.. If such claim is made after four years because of the willful concealment by the health care provider or his insurer, the fund shall have the right of full indemnity including defense costs from such health care provider or his insurer. A filing pursuant to section 401 shall toll the running of the limitations contained herein.
O'Brien v. Eli Lilly & Co., 668 F.2d 704 (3d Cir. 1982) , applying Pennsylvania law. (An action by the victim of vaginal cancer against the manufacturer of DES (diethylstilbestrol) that was ingested by her mother during pregnancy was held barred by the two-year statute of limitations. The plaintiff brought this action more than three years after she read an article concerning the effect of DES on daughters.)
A. McD. v. Rosen, 621 A.2d 128 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). (The two-year statute of limitations set forth in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524 begins to run "as soon as the right to institute and maintain a suit arises; lack of knowledge, mistake or misunderstanding do not toll the running of the statute of limitations.")
United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 100 S. Ct. 352, 62 L. Ed. 2d 259 (1979) , applying federal law. (FTCA case, wherein the statute begins to run when the patient is aware of his injury and its probable causes. It does not depend on his learning that the injury was negligently inflicted. The plaintiff in this case knew of his loss of hearing (bilateral nerve deafness) and that the probable cause of the injury was the administration of neomycin. The fact that the negligence question involved was "technically complex" did not delay the accrual of the claim.)
Levenson v. Souser, 384 Pa. Super. 132, 557 A.2d 1081 (1989). (The patient's cause of action accrued, for statute of limitations purposes in an informed consent case, when she discovered that she had sustained an injury, for which she had not been warned, rather than the actual date of the surgery. The patient need not know the precise extent of her injuries before the statute of limitations will run. Confidence in her physician does not remove the patient's responsibility to be diligent concerning her own medical treatment.)
Pounds v. Lehman, 384 Pa. Super. 358, 558 A.2d 872 (1989). (This was an action alleging that the defendant failed to inform the patient of the risks of back surgery, and specifically of the potential for the development of scar tissue. The discovery rule applied even where the patient discovered the injury within two years of the initial operation. Since one is given a full two years from the date she has acquired actual or imputed knowledge of her injury and its cause by another party, the statute of limitations did not bar a claim filed within two years of the discovery.)
Stauffer v. Ebersole, 385 Pa. Super. 306, 560 A.2d 816 (1989). (In an action for personal injuries to the plaintiff's left hand and arm resulting from excessive exposure to radiation following a radical mastectomy, the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to the physician on statute of limitations grounds, when a question of fact remained as to whether the patient exercised due diligence in finding out the cause of the numbness in her hand.)
Connaught Labs., Inc. v. Lewis, 557 A.2d 40 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989). (In an action for brain injuries incurred from a vaccine reaction, a four-year statute of limitations, which began running from the time of the last vaccination, barred a breach of warranty claim. The two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries begins to run under the discovery rule even though the plaintiff does not know the precise nature of his injuries, if he is aware that an injury has occurred and that the injury is related somehow to the conduct of the defendant. Here a material question of fact, precluding summary judgment, existed as to whether a physician's statement that a child's seizures were not caused by diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus vaccination, after he had earlier said that they were caused by vaccination, excused the mother from her duty to diligently inquire as required to claim the later date.)
Jones v. Philpott, 713 F. Supp. 844 (W.D. Pa. 1989), aff'd 891 F.2d 281 (3d Cir. 1989) , applying Pennsylvania law. (The plaintiff alleged that the use of insulin and electroshock therapy caused her permanent memory loss. The defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. The statute was not tolled until the time that the plaintiff was fully aware of the permanence of her injury, despite the fact that the defendant represented that it was temporary. The plaintiff must file suit within two years of discovery of the first injury caused, rather than the injury for which suit is brought.)
Hunsicker v. Connor, 465 A.2d 24 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). (An action for the failure to remove a foreign body from the eye of the injured patient accrues when he learns that his eye problems were the result of the foreign body. The manic-depressive condition of the plaintiff's counsel does not change his obligation to begin his suit within the statutory period, nor does the incompetent advice of his counsel.)