Except where the Uniform Commercial Code, this section, section 148A.06, or section 541.073 otherwise prescribes, the following actions shall be commenced within two years for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, or other tort, resulting in personal injury, and all actions against physicians, surgeons, dentists, occupational therapists, other health care professionals as defined in section 145.61, and veterinarians as defined in chapter 156, hospitals, sanitariums, for malpractice, error, mistake or failure to cure, whether based on contract or tort; provided a counterclaim may be pleaded as a defense to any action for services brought by a physician, surgeon, dentist, occupational therapists, or other health care professional or veterinarian, hospital or sanitarium, after the limitations herein described notwithstanding it is barred by the provisions of this chapter, if it was the property of the party pleading it at the time it became barred and was not barred at the time the claim sued on originated, but no judgment thereof except for costs can be rendered in favor of the party so pleading it.
Peterson v. St. Cloud Hosp., 460 N.W.2d 635 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). (The trial court erred in holding the plaintiffs' claim against the defendants was barred by the medical malpractice statute of limitations since the plaintiffs did not suffer any damage and their cause of action did not accrue until the husband began radiation and chemotherapy treatment for misdiagnosis of his cancer.)
Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1982) , applying Minnesota law. (The Minnesota two-year statute bars an action begun in 1978 for misdiagnosis occurring in 1942 resulting in inappropriate radiation "therapy," where the treatment (for lymphosarcoma) ceased in 1961, notwithstanding the contention that lymphosarcoma is an incurable disease and that the treatment therefore continues for life.)
Ciardelli v. Rindal, 582 N.W.2d 910, 913 (Minn. 1998), rev'g 565 N.W.2d 465 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). (The plaintiff's dental malpractice action was time-barred because, even though the defendant had refilled the plaintiff's prescription, the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff had already been terminated. The plaintiff did not return for recommended follow-up visits, and the prescription was refilled some 12 months after the plaintiff last saw the defendant.)
Noland v. Freeman, 344 N.W.2d 419 (Minn. 1984). (Where the evidence showed that the patient received treatment for "a follow-up office call" less than two years before she filed suit for malpractice, but there was a disagreement as to the purpose of this office visit, a jury question was presented as to when the physician's treatment ceased and the statute began to run.)
Grondahl v. Bulluck, 318 N.W.2d 240 (Minn. 1982). (Summary judgment for a physician on the basis of the statute of limitations is improper where there is a genuinely disputed issue of fact as to the date when the treatment ceased. The court analyzed the cessation of treatment with the consideration of three factors, concluding that expert testimony would be necessary for the determination).
Goellner v. Butler, 836 F.2d 426 (8th Cir. 1988) , applying Minnesota law. (The court rejected the argument that the defendants had fraudulently concealed a cause of action because they made statements to the effect that the IUD was a safe contraceptive technique and that "these things happen.")