No action for damages for injury or death against any physician, dentist, registered nurse or hospital duly licensed under the laws of this State, whether based upon tort, or breach of contract, or otherwise, arising out of patient care shall be brought more than 2 years after the date on which the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known, or received notice in writing of the existence of the injury or death for which damages are sought in the action, whichever of such date occurs first, but in no event shall such action be brought more than 4 years after the date on which occurred the act or omission or occurrence alleged in such action to have been the cause of such injury or death.
Rio v. Edward Hosp., 120 Ill. App. 3d 699, 458 N.E.2d 606, 76 Ill. Dec. 206 (1983) , aff'd 104 Ill. 2d 354, 472 N.E.2d 421, 84 Ill. Dec. 461 (1984). (A complaint filed less than three months after the plaintiff learned of his injury caused by the defendant is not barred by the notice provision of the Tort Immunity Act, notwithstanding that the alleged malpractice occurred more than one year before filing and no written notice of the injury was given.)
Roberson v. Taylor, 115 Ill. App. 3d 587, 451 N.E.2d 16, 71 Ill. Dec. 528 (1983). (Four-year limitation applies to an action for wrongful birth that occurred nine years after a bilateral vasectomy, notwithstanding that the malpractice could not have been discovered until the pregnancy occurred and by that time the action was already barred.)
Kaplan v. Berger, 184 Ill. App. 3d 224, 539 N.E.2d 1267, 132 Ill. Dec. 461 (1989). (Summary judgment was found inappropriate in a case where the physicians failed to detect the existence of a malignancy on the right leg of a plaintiff with a history of breast cancer. Although the plaintiff was aware of pain and swelling in the leg after minor trauma in 1981, and did not believe that the physicians were properly treating the condition, she might not have known the medical nature of her condition until a biopsy in 1983 revealed malignancy. Therefore, a fact-finder could find that an action filed in 1985 was commenced within the statute of limitations. A factual issue also existed as to whether misdiagnosis of the condition proximately caused subsequent metastasis of the malignancy to her right groin.)
Gara v. Semerad, 183 Ill. App. 3d 622, 539 N.E.2d 298, 131 Ill. Dec. 945 (1989). (The statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases begins to run when a person "knows or reasonably should have known of his injury and, also, knows or reasonably should have known that the injury was wrongfully caused." A material issue of fact existed as to when the plaintiff, a nurse, who had visited several physicians and received conflicting diagnoses, should have known that failure to accurately diagnose her condition was a wrongful cause of harm. Broad criticisms of the personal reputations of some of the defendant physicians made to the plaintiff by various persons, including other defendant physicians, did not address the standard of care received by the plaintiff, and were not sufficient to establish as a matter of law the plaintiff's knowledge of her injury or that it was wrongfully caused.)
McIntyre v. Christ Hosp., 181 Ill. App. 3d 76, 536 N.E.2d 882, 129 Ill. Dec. 832 (1989) , appeal denied, 127 Ill. 2d 620, 545 N.E.2d 113 (1989). (Summary judgment was inappropriate in a medical malpractice claim against a physician who performed a hernia repair on the 6-year-old plaintiff in 1970, 14 years prior to his filing this claim. A genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff, who filed suit within two years after the diagnosis of undescended testicles made in 1983 when he was 20 years old, should have known that the hernia repair was the cause of undescended testicles within two years of attaining majority in 1981.)
Moore v. Jackson Park Hosp., 101 Ill. App. 3d 1009, 428 N.E.2d 1110, 57 Ill. Dec. 430 (1981) , aff'd 95 Ill. 2d 223, 447 N.E.2d 408, 69 Ill. Dec. 191 (1983). (The statute will not be applied to an action by a patient if it bars her claim before she has discovered her injury (a needle was left in her body at surgery), where the amended version of the statute would automatically bar her action. A grace period, i.e., a reasonable amount of time, must be allowed for institution of the action.)
O'Brien v. O'Donoghue, 686 N.E.2d 688, 693 (Ill. App. Ct. 1 Dist. 1997). (Minors' wrongful death claims were allowed as being brought within eight years of date of last treatment, but claims of adult children were barred because, even though allowed by statute of limitations of two years from date of death, claim was not brought within repose period of four years from date of last treatment.)
Young v. McKiegue, 708 N.E.2d 493, 496 (Ill. App. Ct. 1 Dist. 1999) (The statute of limitations began to run on the plaintiff's malpractice claim no later than the date when her attorney received a favorable report from a medical expert. The plaintiff, widow of a patient who died while hospitalized at the defendant's facility and while being treated by individual defendants, knew or reasonably should have known that the decedent's death was wrongfully caused, thus beginning operation of the limitations period, when the attorney she had retained received a report from a medical expert indicating that the decedent's physicians had deviated from the standard of care by not recognizing that the decedent's respiratory distress was cardiac in nature, and that had the decedent been treated appropriately, the outcome may have been different. However, whether the widow knew or reasonably should have known prior to that date that the death was wrongfully caused was a factual issue precluding summary judgment.)
If a person liable to an action fraudulently conceals the cause of such action from the knowledge of the person entitled thereto, the action may be commenced at any time within 5 years after the person entitled to bring the same discovers that he or she has such cause of action, and not afterwards.
Witherell v. Weimer, 85 Ill. 2d 146, 421 N.E.2d 869, 52 Ill. Dec. 6 (1981). (The physicians were held to be estopped by their conduct from profiting from the plaintiff's delay in instituting the action, where they repeatedly deceived the patient into believing that her injury was simply a "muscle condition" rather than the result of blood clotting from contraceptive medication.)
Anderson v. Wagner, 79 Ill. 2d 295, 402 N.E.2d 560, 37 Ill. Dec. 558 (1980). (If at the time the plaintiff discovers the fraudulent concealment a reasonable amount of time remains within the limitation period, Section 22 of the Limitations Act does not toll the running of the period. However, note that the opinion expressly abstains from holding that Section 22 is applicable to medical malpractice cases.)
Burgdorff v. Siquiera, 109 Ill. App. 3d 493, 440 N.E.2d 920, 65 Ill. Dec. 65 (1982). (The four-year statute of limitations applies to all medical malpractice actions, including claims by a patient for "economic loss." The plaintiff alleged that the defendant wrongly advised him to seek early retirement because his prognosis for work was poor, although the defendant believed at the time that he was in good health.)