No action for the recovery of damages upon a claim against a health care provider for personal injury, including personal injury which results in death, arising out of malpractice shall be brought after the expiration of 2 years from the date upon which such injury occurred; provided, however, that solely in the event of personal injury the occurrence of which, during such period of 2 years, was unknown to and could not in the exercise of reasonable diligence have been discovered by the injured person, such action may be brought prior to the expiration of 3 years from the date upon which such injury occurred, and not thereafter; and
Christiana Hospital v. Fattori, 714 A.2d 754, 757-758 (Del. 1998). (The plaintiffs' claims were barred by the two-year medical malpractice limitation, and that the savings statute applicable generally to personal injury suits did not apply to medical malpractice actions. While there was no express legislative rejection of the application of the savings statute as it existed prior to the 1976 enactment of comprehensive malpractice legislation, the sweeping nature of the 1976 law conveyed an intention of a complete break with the past legal treatment of medical malpractice claims. The inconsistency between the pre-existing savings statute and the malpractice act was not merely implied. Thus, another section of the malpractice act had expressly amended the chapter of which the savings statute was part to restrict the period for initiating medical malpractice suits to the time periods set forth in the malpractice statute. Read together, the statutes conveyed a clear intention of writing on a clean slate with respect to the limitations period for these suits.)
Hiznay v. Strange, 415 A.2d 489 (Del. Super. Ct. 1980). (The fracture of an ankle which, following surgery, resulted in pain, swelling, and difficulty in holding the foot in a flat position, was not such an inherently unknowable injury as to come within the exception of the statute. When an injury becomes physically manifest within two years of the date of the alleged malpractice, the two-year limitation period controls.)
Shockley v. Dyer, 456 A.2d 798 (Del. 1983). (The physician's failure to disclose that during the D and C procedure he had found it necessary to remove the patient's ovary was insufficient to toll the statute by virtue of fraudulent concealment, where the plaintiff by exercising due diligence could have discovered her right to sue.)